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PLAINTII I'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT AS A BAR TO RECOVERY UNDER
REGULATION U
Serzisko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N. Y. 1968)
Edward Serzysko borrowed money from the Chase Manhattan Bank
through loans secured primarily by registered securities.1 In obtaining
the loans, he knowingly and intentionally deceived the bank by stating
that the money was not to be used for the purchase of registered
securities. When the stock market declined, the bank sold the stock and
applied the proceeds to Serzysko's debt. In suing for damages,
Serzysko alleged that the loans violated Regulation U. 2 This
regulation, promulgated pursuant to Section 7(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 3 provides that no bank can grant a loan for the
purpose of purchasing registered securities when the loan is secured by
stock and exceeds the maximum loan value of the stock.' The bank
responded to the plaintiff's suit by filing a counterclaim for the unpaid
balance of the loan. Held: Serzysko, an experienced investor familiar
with the provisions of Regulation U, could not mislead the bank into
making loans which violated Regulation U and then recover on the
ground that the bank was negligent in making the loans to him. The
Chase Manhattan Bank, by reason of its failure to accept the plaintiff's
statements in good faith as defined in Regulation U,5 could not recover
the amount due on the loan.
I Registered securities are "issues of stock which are registered on a national securities
exchange " erzy,ko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2 12 ( 1- R. , 221 (1969). In effect, Serzysko's request for damages was no more than an
action for recission on the grounds of illegality. If his obligation under the loan contract was
rescinded, then the bank would be liable for the shares of stock sold. Serzysko v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 290 1- Supp. 74, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3 15 U SC. , 79g(Supp. IV, 1969).
4 "No bank shall extend any credit secured directly or indirectly by any stock for the purpose
of purdhasing or carrying any stock registered on a national securities exchange. . . in an amount
exceeding the maximum loan value of the collateral .. .- 12 C.F.R. § 221.1 (1969) (footnotes
omitted) Maximum loan value is sometimes referred to as the minimum margin requirement.
Serzsko % Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The maximum loan
value is the percentage of current market value at which the lender is required to value registered
securities 12 C F R. , 221.4 (1969); L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1244 (1961). In Serzysko
the plaintift' loan exceeded the maximum loan value of the securities. Serzysko v. Chase
Manhatten Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
5 I-he lender can rely on the statements of the borrower regarding the purpose of the loan if
accepted in good faith. "To accept the customer's statement in good faith, the officer must (1)
be ,alert to the circumstances surrounding the credit and (2) if he has any information which would
cause a prudent man not to accept the statement without inquiry, have investigated and be
satisfied that the customer's statement is truthful." 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(a) (1969).
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In disposing of plaintiff's claim, the court begins with the premise
that implied private actions are available to investor-borrowers against
lenders who violate Regulation U.1 The court then considers the nature
of the action to determine whether the plaintiff, by intentionally
deceiving the defendant, forfeited his right of recovery.7 In the leading
case of Remnar v. Clayton Securities Corporation, the implied remedy
was considered an action in tort.' Since the Remar court based the tort
action on § 286 of the Restatement, it can be argued that the defenses
created by § 286(d) should apply.' Under § 286(d), the plaintiff is
barred from recovery if he "has so conducted himself as to disable him-
self from maintaining an action." The Serzysko court reasons that
§ 286(d) must be read in the light of the Supreme Court case of J.I.
Case v. Borak.10 In Borak, the Court held that a civil remedy was to
be implied for violation of Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act
since the creation of such an action would further the legislative
purpose behind the statute." The Serzysko court, then, argues that the
limitation imposed by § 286(d) should only be available if, by applying
it, the legislative purpose of the statute involved would be furthered. Since
legislative purpose, not the common law of remedies, is controlling, the
court rejects Chase Manhattan's suggestion that the doctrine of in pari
delicto should bar the plaintiff's recovery.' To buttress this conclusion,
the Serzysko court quotes from the Supreme Court's discussion of in
6. The Securities Exchange Act does not provide a private cause of action for a violation of
the margin requirements. Nevertheless the courts have consistently implied private actions for
such violations. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and
cases cited; Note, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1462 (1966).
7. Despite arguments that the implied action was not meant to cover experienced investors like
Serzysko, the court held that the matter of his experience should determine his right to recover,
not his right to sue. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8. 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
9. The Remar court specifically uses this provision. Id. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)
provides as follows:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the
other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard,
the invasion of the interests results from the hazard; and,
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
10. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
II. Id. at 433-34.
12. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 88-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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parl delicto in Perina Life Mulfflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corporation."' The court then concludes by reasoning that allowing
recovery would encourage deception of lenders by investor-borrowers
and increase the amount of illegal credit in the market. 4 Thus, despite
their rejection of the in pari delicto defense, and despite the negligence
of Chase Manhattan, the court denies Serzysko relief on the basis of
his own conduct.
In determining the defendant's counterclaim, the court reasoned that
since the bank was negligent in not discovering the falsity of the
plaintiff's statements, and since such negligence was prohibited by
statute, it was barred from relief by its own conduct. 5
Traditionally, the words "in pari delicto" mean "in equal fault."' 6
The doctrine is used in tort to bar contribution among joint
tortfeasors,' and in contract to deny any type of affirmative relief to
one breaching party against another.' The general rule is that when
parties are in equal fault, or in pari delicto, no relief is given either
party unless public policy demands otherwise. 9
In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corporation,20
the Supreme Court held that the public policy behind private anti-trust
actions made the defense of in pari delicto unavailable when'the
plaintiffs participation in the illegal arrangement "was not voluntary
in any meaningful sense." 2' Justice Black, writing the opinion of the
Court, flatly rejected the doctrine of in pari delicto. The plaintiff's
remedy. Justice Black reasoned, was expressly granted to him for the
purpose of aiding the government in enforcing the anti-trust laws. This
purpose should not be frustrated by denying relief on the basis of an
implied defense22
It should be noted, however, that Justice Black wrote only for
himself and three other justices. The other five justices recognized the
defense of in pari delicto or some modified version of it. Mr. Justice
13 392 U S. 134 (1968).
14 S rzsko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 89-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
15 Id at 90
16. Bi %( i,'s Lvw DiCTIO ARY 898 (4th ed. 1951).
17 %,'., V PROSSER, HxNDBOOK OF TH Lx\w OF TORTS 273-78 (3d ed. 1964).
IS ( I R\an v. Motor Credit Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607 (Ch. N.J. 1941).
19 Sc,, 0, . d (f Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192 N.E.2d 167,
242 N Y S 2d 210 (I1963), Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Pace Excavating Co., 91 Ohio L. Abs. 184, 187
N I 2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
20 392 1 S. 134 (1968).
21. Id at I39,
22 Id at 138-39.
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White, for example, conceded that in pari delicto cannot be used to
frustrate legislative purpose. Nonetheless, he would have applied a test
denying recovery "where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially
equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them but permit [ting]
recovery in favor of the one less responsible where one is more
responsible than the other. 2 3
The remedy in Perma was expressly created by statute; that in
Serzysko is implied. Nevertheless, there are similar policies behind their
creations. The anti-trust treble damages for which the plaintiff in
Perma brought action was meant to serve both as a threat to violators
and as an incentive for injured individuals to bring violations to light
by private action.2 4 Borak and the line of implied liability cases
following it use the same policy arguments to justify civil recovery in
the absence of express statutory authority." Since the policies behind
congressionally imposed anti-trust damages and judicially implied
liability under the Securities Exchange Act are the same, and since five
justices of the Supreme Court felt that at least a modified form of in
pari delicto should serve as a defense to antitrust actions based on an
express remedy, the way is clear for the courts to allow a similar
defense to implied recovery under Regulation U.26
The Serzysko court allowed the plaintiff's actions to bar his
23. Id. at 146. Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring, would ask if "the fault of the parties is
reasonably within the same scale." Id. at 147. Mr. Justice Marshall, also concurring, would
"hold that where a defendant ... can show that the plaintiff actively participated in the
formation and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is substantially equally at fault, the
plaintiff should be barred from imposing liability." Id. at 149. Justices Harlan and Stewart
concur and dissent in part. They would bar recovery by "(p)laintiffs who ...have themselves
violated the law in cooperation with the defendant." Id. at 153.
24. Id. at 138-39.
25. J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); Globus v. Law Research Inc., CCH
FED. SEc. LAW REP., C. 92,374 at p. 98242.43 (2d Cir. 1969).
26. Cf. Flusk v. Erie R.R., 110 F. Supp. 118 (D.N.J. 1953). The case involved a railroad
employee's action against the railroad under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and against a
shipper under common law, for injuries sustained during loading operations. The court held that
a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the employee would have barred his action
against the shipper, but would have acted only as a proportionate diminishing factor in any
verdict against the railroad. In a similar case involving the Jones Act, the court held that the
defendant employer could use neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence as a
complete defense; nevertheless, the third-party defendant shipyards, not subject to the Jones Act,
could use both. Ginsburg v. Standard Oil Co., 5 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). These cases suggest
that courts are willing to go farther in granting relief to a plaintiff bringing an action under a
regulatory statute than to a plaintiff bringing an action under common law. Thus, courts would
probably go farther in granting relief to a plaintiff in an action under civil antitrust law than to
a plaintiff in an implied action under Regulation U.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/5
Vol. 1969: 355]
recovery. But it ignores or rejects the kind of modified in pari delicto
defenses proposed by the concurring and dissenting Justices in Perma
without articulating any standard to take their place. By basing its
denial of relief strictly on policy, and by failing to indicate the factors
which might determine the applicability of its decision in future
litigation, the court exposes itself to criticism.
Though the Serzvsko court reasons that the legislative purpose
behind Regulation U will not be furthered if recovery is allowed to
plaintiffs who intentionally deceive lenders, it ignores the possibility
that allowing such recovery might encourage bankers to comply with
the Act. If, despite the intention of the borrower, bankers were held
liable because of their negligence, they would, arguably, be more
careful in extending credit. This would mean that the amount of credit
in the market would be more carefully controlled. 27 In support of this
argument, it should be noted that Congress did not prohibit a borrower
from wilfully seeking credit in violation of the act. 28 Imposing
uncompromising liability on a bank which negligently violates
Regulation U. then, would seem at least as consistent with furthering
legislative purpose as the holding of the Serzysko court.29 The court,
however, assumes that under such a system the bank would be acting
as an insurer for a plaintiff who intentionally deceives them. But if the
bank can show that it has made a reasonable investigation they have
an absolute defense."'
The court's failure to articulate the standard it applies to bar
Serzysko's recovery creates a further problem. If the court's ruling is
broadly read, it will discourage investor borrowers from bringing
damage actions under Regulation U. t' This would frustrate the judicial
policy which allows individuals to bring violations to light by private
damage suits. Many investors have at least some knowledge of
27 ' e Note. 66 Coit \i. L Ri x 1462. 1475 (1966).
2h 1\crz sko '. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F, Supp. 74, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
29 ( I Kuehnert . Texstar Corp., 412 F,2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969) (dissent); Wade. BenelitT
Obtatmed I nder Ileia Tr t a(r totrz Rcaxotn For and 4 gainst Allowing Restitution. 25 TEXAS
L_. Ri % 3 1, 55-56 1946)
30 12 ( 1- R k 221 3 (1969).
31 I he court asserts that the 'knowing and intentional making of a false statement is fraught
with prejudice" to enforcement of the regulation. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F.
Supp 74. 89 iS D.\ Y 1968) The), also point to Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453
(E.D N Y 196K) in hch the plaintif's willful participation in a margin requirement violation
was held to bar his subsequent recovery under Regulation T. Nonetheless the court holds only
that the delendant "by reason of his conduct, should be denied relief. . Serzysko v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 290 F Supp. 74, 90 (S. D N. Y. 1968).
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Regulation U. In any event, at the time of the loan the borrower who
pledges securities signs a purpose statement." He deliberately deceives
the lender if he intends to purchase securities but states that the loan
is for another purpose. Since all borrowers who use registered securities
as collateral for bank loans must sign such a statement,33 nearly any
person bringing action under Regulation U can be found to have
intentionally deceived the lender. If intentional deceit is a nearly
absolute bar to suit, as could be implied from the Serzysko court's
opinion, 34 then suits for recovery would be virtually impossible to
sustain.
By articulating a standard which could relate to other fact situations,
rather than deriving a holding from the broad basis of enforcement
policy without identifying the specific factors it considered controlling,
the court could have avoided the criticisms just noted. The equal
responsibility standard purposed by Justice White in Perma offers at
least a guide to the kind of test which should have been applied.33
Under the equal responsibility test, the bank could not avoid liability
by merely pointing to its deception by the borrower. To bar a recovery,
its own negligent conduct would have to be less blameworthy than that
of the borrowers.36 On the other hand, wilful deception would not be
encouraged since a borrower's calculated deception might overshadow
the defendant's mere negligence. This balancing approach harmonizes
with the purposes behind implied remedies. It is submitted that the kind
of flexible standard articulated by Justice White in Permna should be
applied in the context of Regulation U
32. 12 C.F.R. § 221.3 (1969).
33. Id.
34. See note 3 1, supra.
35. This sort of weighing of liabilities has worked well in other contexts. In tort, the party
whose negligence has been passive may have contribution from an active tortfeasor. See. e.g.,
Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192 N.E.2d 167, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210
(1963); Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Pace Excavating Co., 91 Ohio. L. Abs. 184, 187 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1963). Since the burden of compliance is on the banker, one could draw analogies to
situations in which a party who is under secondary liability is allowed to recover from another
who is under primary liability. See. e.g.. City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal.2d
127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958); Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg Co., 133
Conn. 536, 52 A.2d 862 (1947). In contract, relief'is granted when public policy would be
advanced by allowing the more excusable of the two parties to recover. Ryan v. Motor Credit
Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607 (Ch. N.J. 1941); see. e.g.. Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400,410 (N.D. 11. 1964).
36. Since Congress has imposed no sanction on a borrower who causes a violation of
Regulation U, it would seem that in most circumstances the negligence of the bank could be found
at least as culpable as the "intention" of a borrower. The borrower may only be dimly aware of
the law, or he might have acted solely at the instigation of a broker who told him that signing
the purpose statement was a mere formality.
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